Herries, the grandson of a minor Dumfriesshire laird, rose from the obscurity of a treasury clerkship to become chancellor of the exchequer, but acquired a probably undeserved reputation as a ‘rogue’.
As commissary he continued Gordon’s attempts to reduce the jobbery and administrative inefficiency which had long bedevilled the department, seeking to improve the supply lines for Wellington’s Peninsular army. He now defended the bank restriction as an incentive to the importation of capital. Crucially, from 1814 he organized the successful financing of the invasion of France and defeat of Buonaparte through large infusions of French money into the war chest. In this enterprise he worked closely with the German Jewish financier Nathan Rothschild of New Court, London, whose firm supplied the bullion and established their massive fortune in so doing. Herries also involved in these transactions his friend Baron Limburger, a Leipzig tobacco merchant, whose wife was (before her marriage) the reputed mother of the illegitimate daughter whom Herries had fathered during his student days. (It is possible that the Limburgers were blackmailing him.) While some of the Rothschilds’ methods were highly dubious and they had hastily to cook the books at the end of the war, there is no convincing evidence that Herries acted corruptly, by contemporary standards. Yet he undoubtedly profited significantly from his association with the Rothschilds: he was a regular participant in and beneficiary of lucrative post-war loans to European governments. There was inevitably ‘strong suspicion’ in some quarters that he had feathered his nest by jobbing in the stock market, as Edward Littleton* noted, 21 Dec. 1835: he ‘certainly never inherited any fortune [and] can now spend £10,000 a year. I have never heard any of his friends account for his wealth by any other means than that he turned the early information his office gave him to good account’.
We go on grumbling here against our masters, with whom ... no persons ... are really satisfied ... I cannot perceive that they make up in worth what they lack in talent. As the government is now constituted I hope I shall never be called upon to connect myself more closely ... with it. Some changes that would bring forward younger and better statesmen would alter my inclination ... In the meantime I will gradually withdraw from all extra work for these men and pursue my own way of living, which inclines to domestic enjoyment ... Many very respectable men are retiring from the ... Commons, from the absolute want of any attachment to the government ... These men will I fear be mostly succeeded by reformers and Jacobins, for there is but little management used in supplying these vacancies at the great House.
Add. 57418, Herries to ‘Dear Sir’, 8 June 1818.
He welcomed the recommendations of the 1819 committee on the resumption of cash payments, though he dissented from the principles espoused in their report.
In his first reported speech, 18 Mar. 1823, Herries (a government teller in at least 36 divisions in the 1820 Parliament) opposed repeal of the window tax and argued that although there was some localized distress ‘the general state of the country’ did not justify tax cuts and interference with the sinking fund. He resisted an attempt to legalize the off-sale of small quantities of beer by public brewers, 28 May, and defended the government’s beer duties bill, 13 June. His relationship with the Rothschilds enabled him in October 1823 to broker their contract for settlement of the £2,500,000 Austrian loan, which he explained to the House, 24 Feb. 1824.
Herries came in unopposed for Harwich at the general election in June 1826. Later that year he oversaw ministerial efforts to relieve the silk workers of Lancashire and Cheshire.
in a state of the greatest possible distress ... pledged to make Canning minister, but now feeling that it is impossible or at least most highly inexpedient ... He asked Herries whether in his opinion Canning was fit to be minister ... Herries ... said he was in a subordinate situation and would not presume to give an opinion. Sir William pressed him and at least he said that ... [Canning] was not fit, that if he was at the head of affairs he would, from his indiscretion, the violence of his temper and his want of management, get the government into perpetual scrapes, that age and long official habits had not corrected these faults ... [which] rendered him wholly unfit.
Yet Herries, whom Canning ‘courted and flattered up to the eyes’, decided to remain in office under him, even though his natural affinity was with Peel and the other anti-Catholic seceders; he claimed that ‘any junction with the [Whig] enemy’ was the Rubicon which I cannot pass’. When he saw the Lansdowne Whigs being admitted piecemeal to office and discovered ‘more and more how much ... Canning had been for a considerable time implicated’ with them, he grew disgruntled, but it was too late to escape. His suggestion, derived from a notion of Robinson (now Lord Goderich), that he might be put at woods and forests, which ‘would be agreeable to the king’, while continuing to transact ‘a great deal of important [treasury] business ... in Parliament’, was dismissed by Canning.
I have been completely knocked up by the fatigues which the peculiar circumstances of the late session heaped upon me ... I was not only weary but sick of all that was going on and vexed that ... I was unable without dealing fairly by the public service to withdraw myself from the mess ... I am now getting better, but ... a long interval of relaxation is indispensably necessary for my complete restoration ... I have given warning to Canning that I cannot face the double work of my station ... He wants me to take some situation in which I may have more honour and more ease, so as to be able to assist him in finance and in Parliament. I have discouraged these propositions, but I have assured him that I will endeavour as much as possible to meet his convenience in the mode and time of my ultimately giving up my present office.
Two weeks later he welcomed Arbuthnot’s news of a friendly meeting between Wellington and the king:
The more good feeling between them is maintained the greater will be the facility for getting things right again when the proper opportunity arrives. I am quite confident that the new friends cannot long continue so ... The special imprudence and fiery temper of some of the leaders must inevitably lead to a violent separation ... The possession of the government during the remainder of the present reign ... by the Tories will then depend upon the prudence of their management at that juncture ... I am getting out of my trammels, but using my best endeavours to do so without creating inconvenience or embarrassment to anyone. I shall give every assistance in my power to prepare for the difficult arrangements which we have to make in the next session, upon the successful execution of which the stability of the government, let who will be at the head of it, must materially depend.
Arbuthnot, wishing that Herries would ‘not try to lessen ...[ministers’] difficulties’, showed this letter to Wellington and Peel, who doubted the ‘correctness’ of his prediction of a fatal split. By 5 Aug 1827 Herries, whose impending resignation was now public knowledge, was on the verge of embarking on an extended European tour, though he feared that the ailing Canning’s death in the immediate future would ‘embarrass me exceedingly’.
As Canning lapsed towards his death in the small hours of 8 Aug. 1827, Herries was persuaded by Lyndhurst and Planta to postpone his departure.
looking very ill ... He says he must for the present resign, as he is completely done up and must be abroad. He said he did not know until lately the extent of the intrigue and dirty work that had been going on ... He thinks he will for the present decline on the score of health, but support as a looker-on ... He advocates oblivion of the past, but rather as it regards Tories in, and did not say anything distinct as to the policy of a mixture of Whigs.
Add. 57419, T.P. Courtenay to Herries, 9 Aug. 1827; Wellington Despatches, iv. 75; Palmerston-Sulivan Letters, 191.
On 10 Aug. Goderich called twice on Herries, who ‘assured him that he might consider me as remaining attached to his administration’, but told him that his wish to leave the treasury still held and, when sounded about the exchequer, to which the king had suggested appointing him, recommended Huskisson. He then went into the country.
I am put in a most perplexing and uncomfortable situation, by that which to most men would be a subject of great exultation ... The government is to remain unchanged except that two Tories, Charles Grant* and myself, are to be introduced ... while no new Whig is to come in. The Whigs it is said are to be kept down. But it is a weak government, and can hardly go on. Ought I to run the risk of going down with it ... or ... without any good reason to allege throw away the opportunity of advancement and the favour of the king by refusing? ... If I refuse ... I must do so upon the ground that I cannot resolve in the present state of my health to take upon me so heavy and anxious a charge ... Pray let me have a line ... stating your opinion, on ... the supposition that though really unwell enough to justify a refusal, I am yet in a state to hope to be soon well enough to justify an acceptance. So that ... the acceptance or refusal must spring in my own mind from political feelings.
Hardinge commented to Wellington that although Herries had ‘openly stated’ that Goderich’s ministry ‘won’t stand the first week of the session’, he had ‘blown so often hot and cold that I think he will not refuse the bait’; but Mrs. Arbuthnot thought it would be ‘strange’ if he accepted.
‘really be an excellent man for the office’, being ‘a very intelligent, clearheaded man ... of strict integrity’, and who if he had ‘not at present perhaps the scope of mind which belongs to a cabinet situation’ might develop it with time.
Palmerston-Sulivan Letters, 193-6; Greville Mems. i. 184; Huskisson Pprs. 226-30; BL, Althorp mss, Tavistock to Spencer, 15 Aug.; Add. 38750, f. 39; 51677, Lord J. Russell to Holland, 16 Aug.; Harrowby mss, Sturges Bourne to Harrowby, 19 Aug. 1827; TNA 30/29/9/5/53.
In an interview with Goderich, Lyndhurst and the Whig cabinet member Lord Carlisle, 21 Aug., the king stressed, for the benefit of Lansdowne and Tierney, that while he was willing to await Huskisson’s arrival, he had no intention of admitting Holland to the cabinet and was determined to have Herries.
again a scene of unmanly perplexity. I could not learn from him what his real intentions were ... It appeared quite clear, however, that the Whigs had threatened to resign if my appointment were persisted in, and he threw out some indistinct hints of his own disposition to resign if they did. I told him I could not understand his feelings in that respect ... He seemed puzzled by this, but he said there were circumstances which I did not know, and which he could not explain to me ... The king is come to town and I much suspect the affair will thereby be brought to a crisis. Either the Whigs will give way, or he will turn them out ... The Whigs are disseminating lies about me.
Add. 57419.
Palmerston felt that the Whigs would be mad to resign over Herries’s appointment, while Henry Brougham*, anxious to keep out the old Tories and secure the party’s hold on power, thought they should swallow it if he ‘satisfactorily’ denied, when questioned directly, that ‘he ever made a farthing’ by stock jobbing with Rothschild. Holland, however, stressed to Lansdowne ‘the utter impossibility of undertaking the business of the House of Commons with a finance minister whose views and principles are unknown to you’ and argued that the rumours about his connections, even if false, were ‘an additional inconvenience’ to an appointment ‘only recommended by Court favour or Court intrigue’.
His part in the episode which wrecked Goderich’s government four months later was perhaps less innocent. In cabinet in late November 1827 he joined Tierney in opposing Huskisson and Lansdowne’s wish to back the Russian plan to invade Moldavia and Walachia. According to Mrs. Arbuthnot, in a ‘long conversation’ with her husband he
told the same story as [William] Holmes* of the dissensions in the cabinet ... He said the king and Knighton are very hostile to the Whigs and are quite resolved to turn them out if they get into any difficulties. If this does occur, they are determined to send for ... [Wellington]. He said Lord Goderich was laughed at and despised by everybody ... He was positive there must be a break-up ... He added that, if war was determined on, he would retire (the only part of his story I don’t believe).
When informed of this by Arbuthnot, Peel commented:
I distrust all that is said to you by Herries, except so far as it is confirmed by other circumstances. As he has waded up to his chin through the widest part of the Rubicon, he is naturally ashamed of himself. That we should have lived to see the day, when instead of mending the blunders in the malt bill, he, Herries, backed by Tierney, is giving peace to Europe by resisting the invasion of Moldavia and Walachia!
Herries, ii. 3-7; Arbuthnot Jnl. ii. 149-50; Arbuthnot Corresp. 93; Von Neumann Diary, i. 180; Wellington Despatches, iv. 168.
On 28 Nov. Herries was informed by Huskisson that the leading Whig backbencher Lord Althorp, whom ministers wished to cultivate, was being considered as chairman of the finance committee. The idea had originated with Tierney, who had already secured Goderich’s approval and now revealed to Herries that Althorp had accepted in principle. Herries, by all accounts, ‘concurred without qualification’. Next day he told Huskisson that he had had second thoughts, considering Althorp to be a ‘dangerous reformer’. On the 30th Huskisson heard from Planta that Herries was ‘very sore’ and was falsely alleging that he had only found out about the proposal from a backbencher and that the arrangement had been covertly made. Huskisson ordered Tierney to stop considering names for the committee with anyone outside the cabinet and wrote to Herries arguing that Althorp would be ‘safer’ in the chair than as a member of the committee. As Herries did not raise the issue when they met in cabinet on 3 Dec., Huskisson assumed that the ‘misconception’ had been removed and the matter was in abeyance. Tierney did continue to negotiate covertly with Althorp, which gave Herries the semblance of a genuine grievance and a handy pretext for his next move.
The recall of Wellington and Peel did not advance his political career. Wellington’s initial notion to make him chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster was unacceptable to the king, who did ‘not like’ his removal from the exchequer, though he was agreeable to his being appointed president of the board of trade. Meanwhile Herries brokered a deal with Rothschild to lend money, guaranteed by the new ministry, to Dom Miguel.
In the House, 6 Feb. 1828, Herries squabbled with Hume over the accounts for exchequer bill payments. He advised Peel, the home secretary, on the most acceptable composition of the finance committee, to which he was appointed, 15 Feb. He was very active on it, gave evidence to it and drew up its fourth report, which belatedly endorsed the policy of tariff reform.
The office which I now fill is a mere sinecure and ... such as might be held by any person who, by high rank or influential connections, though unqualified by official ability or experience, might add to the strength of your government. My only means of being in any degree useful ... must consist in the efficient discharge of some public duties; and I ... feel myself out of my proper position so long as I occupy an office suited to the station and influence which I do not possess, and unsuited to the exercise of any little ability which I may have acquired ... I feel it to be right, now that you are about making a new distribution of ... offices ... candidly to state that it would have given me more satisfaction if ... it would have accorded with your arrangements to place me in a situation of more labour and responsibility.
Wellington entreated him to ‘be satisfied, and have patience, and be assured that you must rise eventually to offices of more business’, and meanwhile to make the most of his freedom from departmental duties, which allowed him to ‘assist the government on a variety of subjects’.
He was consulted on the question of renewal of the Bank’s charter in September and was briefly ill in November.
In October 1829 Herries accompanied Bexley to his swearing-in as high steward of Harwich and got away without trouble on the score of his support for Catholic emancipation.
so woefully ill that nothing else has been talked of ... He seems to have quite broken down and been unable to express himself ... Pushing on Herries has done the duke’s government more harm than anything ... [Wellington] is aware, I think, what a mistake he made when he promoted him ... I am surprised at Herries’s failure, for no doubt he understands all subjects of trade and finance better than anyone, is a very hard headed, shrewd man, and it seems surprising that such a man should be so utterly incapable of putting his ideas into words. Lord Althorp told ... Arbuthnot that, upon the finance committee, nobody gave so much or such valuable information as he did, or proved so clearly how perfectly informed he was upon every subject of finance.
Grey mss, Howick jnl. 10, 16 Mar.; Agar Ellis diary, 10 Mar. 1830; Howard Sisters, 125; Arbuthnot Jnl. ii. 345-6.
In cabinet Herries, who did not believe that the reduction of import duties on foreign goods had caused distress, joined Goulburn and Peel in arguing for the imposition of a property tax in order to reduce the indirect tax burden ‘on the shoulders of the middling and labouring classes’, a policy which he had intended to promote when chancellor. They were overruled by Wellington and a majority of the cabinet.
there will be no considerable change in the relative numbers of the principal parties in the House, but I fear the radical party will be more influential, and radical reforms of all kinds more in favour ... The business of the government, whether in yielding to these demands or resisting them, will be most difficult, and to satisfy the two factions, the conservative and the subversive, or either of them, if it pursues a prudent course, will be quite impossible.
NLW, Harpton Court mss C/430, Herries to Lewis, 19 Aug. [1830].
Since April he had been involved in negotiations with the United States for the removal of restrictions on trade between America and the British West Indian colonies. A settlement was concluded before the new Parliament met, and on 8 Nov. 1830 Herries explained his proposals, which he again defended on the 12th as no departure from free trade principles. When Mrs. Arbuthnot asked John Doherty* ‘whether, putting aside the dullness of the speech, there was much information in it, he said I was supposing an impossible case for that he would defy anyone to attend to him’.
As the Tory men of business considered how to organize the party in unfamiliar opposition to the Grey ministry, Arbuthnot initially wished to exclude Herries ‘as a cabinet minister’. Ellenborough reflected that he ‘never should’ have been one, but felt ‘it would be difficult to set him aside’, especially as he was ‘an able and practised man of trade and finance’. When Herries called on him a few days later to urge prompt action to secure the services of a daily newspaper, Ellenborough was ‘rather embarrassed’; but in the event he became one of the small opposition press management committee. Herries, who was described by Mrs. Arbuthnot in January 1831 as ‘the most active of the late government’, despaired of doing much with the provincial press, fearing that ‘we have so completely let go of all the lines of this machinery that we shall have difficulty in getting hold of them again’. While Wellington was encouraging, Peel was reported to be averse to ‘attempts to get hold of the press’, which inclined Herries to suggest a temporary suspension of this work, as ‘it would be most unadvisable to adopt any measures in which he did not concur’, though he remained convinced of the ‘necessity for some exertion on our part to obtain a voice for our party, the conservative’. On a visit to Drayton in the third week of April he found Peel
much as usual, extremely circumspect in all that he says and does, but acting very indifferently the character of a country gentleman indifferent to office and politics. He is ... much more hearty in the anti-ministerial cause than he acknowledges ... I made no impression on him with respect to the press: at least, he would come to no conclusion ... My habits of intimacy with him are not such as would have warranted me in pressing any subject much upon him. Upon the whole ... I think he is very well disposed, and will pursue a firm and prudent line in the ensuing session ... But he must cultivate his party with more warmth, or he will lose it.
In the end the committee had to fall back on the Morning Post, and the Albion was recruited under the auspices of the shady McEntaggart.
it appears to have had a good effect ... I saw no evil spirit in the House ... beyond a cowardly desire of many of the Members to curry favour with their constituents by manifestations of anti-corruption, as they are pleased to call it ... The ministry looked dull and black.
He heard that there were ‘symptoms of schism among them on the subject of reform’, and at the turn of the year claimed to know from ‘the most unquestionable authority’ (probably Maberly) that there was ‘serious dissension in the enemy’s camp’.
Arbuthnot asked him, at Wellington’s behest, to exert himself to ‘get up our friends’ for ‘the fullest possible attendance’ on the first day of the new Parliament. He was requested by some party understrappers to seek the approval of Wellington and Peel for a non-party dinner to rally anti-reformers. He did so, though he doubted the wisdom of the idea, to which Wellington had no objection but which Peel dismissed. Herries, who was unable to accept Peel’s invitation to join Holmes and Planta at Drayton, now detected among the opposition rank and file a stiffening resolve to oppose reform.
I do not recover from my black fit. The indications of the last few days make me more gloomy. The government are now evidently prepared for defeat in the Lords upon the [reform] bill, and as evidently determined to carry it through ultimately at all hazards ... I have written ... to the duke to let him know this. The wine duties are a hopeless case ... We had a poor attendance, and their troops were well marshalled and ready to stand by them, thick and thin ... Luckily Peel was not there. If he had been ... he would have thrown us overboard. No person who has not seen this House of Commons can form a notion of it. We who have ... can judge somewhat of the character and composition of the future reformed House.
Arbuthnot Corresp. 149.
He voted against the passage of the reform bill, 21 Sept., and the second reading of the Scottish measure, 23 Sept. Being ‘pledged’ on the sugar duties, he was ‘induced to stay away’ from the debate of 30 Sept.
The revised reform bill, against the second reading of which he voted, 17 Dec. 1831, brought him back to reality; a few days later Arbuthnot told his wife, ‘I have not called on Herries as he would kill me with croaking’.
Old Croker, when we shouted, looked heavenly blue with rage - You’d have said he had the cholera in the spasmodic stage. Dawson was red with ire as if his face was smeared with berries. But of all human visages, the worst was that of Herries.
Macaulay Letters, ii. 155.
On 7 Aug. 1832 he seized on ministers’ tardy concession of an extension of the time to allow potential urban voters to pay their rates as proof that the Reform Act could not be ‘final’.
Herries predicted the Conservative debacle at the 1832 general election, when he topped the poll at Harwich, as he did in 1835 and 1837.
