Rigby’s grand-father bought Mistley in 1703;
Descriptions of him by three contemporaries bear out and complement each other. Horace Walpole wrote c.1759:
Rigby had an advantageous and manly person, recommended by a spirited jollity that was very pleasing, though sometimes roughened into brutality; of most insinuating good-breeding when he wished to be agreeable. His passions were turbulent and overbearing; his courage bold and fond of exerting itself. His parts strong and quick, but totally uncultivated; and so much had he trusted to unaffected common sense, that he could never afterwards acquire the necessary temperament of art in his public speaking. He had been a pupil of Winnington and ... grew to think it sensible to laugh at the shackles of morality; and having early encumbered his fortune by gaming, he found his patron’s maxims but too well adapted to retrieve his desperate fortunes ... He was a man who was seldom loved or hated with moderation.
Some twenty years later an anonymous journalist wrote in the English Chronicle:
Mr. Rigby is a very complicated character ... He is hospitable, sincere, convivial, and entertaining; but he is at the same time violent, despotic, insolent, and superficial ... He has two characteristic methods of displaying his habitual hauteur, either by an open undisguised neglect, or by converting the object into general ridicule. He is of singular service to the minister, as a parliamentary speaker; for in those cases where all appearance of delicacy is to be resigned ... no man applies the whip with more risible dexterity ... nor ... with so little reserve, reluctance, or decency. His severity is ... infinitely more rude and direct than that of any other individual in the House.
And here are a few additional touches from Wraxall’s Memoirs (i. 420-2):
As if he had meant to show that he acted independently of ministers and was above their control, he never sat on the Government side of the House of Commons; but he did not on that account give the less unqualified support on all occasions to Administration ... His countenance was very expressive, but not of genius; still less did it indicate timidity or modesty ... Whatever he meant he expressed indeed without circumlocution or declamation ... He seemed neither to fear nor even to respect the House ... to the members of which ... he never appeared to give credit for any portion of virtue, patriotism, or public spirit. Far from concealing these sentiments, he insinuated, or even pronounced, them without disguise; and from his lips they neither excited surprise nor even commonly awakened reprehension.
He showed disrespect even to the Speaker. On 26 Jan. 1762 he lectured Cust on his duty to enforce the orders of the House—‘permit me to say you are but young in the Chair: ... I have been long enough in the House to know what is, and what is not obedience to orders’.
Still, the three contemporary accounts, correct as far as they go, do not tell the whole story: how was it that in a parliamentary career of 43 years, Rigby, in spite of a dominant personality, great ability, and ruthless courage, never attained front rank in Government? The posts he held were lucrative but not politically effective. Lack of humanity and subtlety made of him a blind driving force; sadistically destructive, he would attack in cold fury, often without purpose and regardless of circumstances, a bravo rather than a statesman. He also was greedy for money. But money-grabbing and aggressiveness often stem from deep-seated anxiety, and, like so many bullies, Rigby could be silenced if met or baited in his own way (e.g. by Barré). Knowing how to hurt and vulnerable himself, when chance of responsible office came his way, he appeared halfhearted about it. And when toward the end of the American war, and during the years that followed, he was called upon to refund the vast sums of money he held as paymaster, Rigby temporized and shuffled to obtain a respite, and faded out politically.
In 1754 Bedford was the one great Whig peer in declared opposition to the Pelhams. Rigby stood again for Sudbury, with a good deal of bravado but conscious that against the long purses of his opponents backed by the Government, he was fighting a losing battle. Next he went to contest Newport in Cornwall (where the election came on a week later) standing on Bedford’s interest against that of Humphry Morice and the Government; and lost after ‘the hottest poll this town ever saw’.
In September 1755 Fox, appointed secretary of state, tried through Rigby (too sensible ‘to amuse himself ... with politics that had no solid views’)
His Grace ... approves of my house, where there can be no interruption, and is extremely disposed to take the part we wish him to do: indeed I make no doubt but he has concluded upon it.
On 3 Jan. 1757 Bedford was appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland, and Rigby his secretary. Emphatically he assured the Duke on 20 Jan.: ‘I shall [not
At the end of 1759 Rigby resigned his place at the Board of Trade as incompatible with frequent residence in Ireland.
In the House Rigby now became the foremost spokesman of the Bedfords. The Duke being a sincere pacifist, Rigby, on 9 Dec. 1761, inveighed against the German war—why ‘run such lengths for a little power like the elector of Brandenburg ... If the King of Prussia receives our money, he is to serve us, not we him’;
Fox, informed by Shelburne on 20 May that ‘Rigby will be provided for’,
I have known Rigby these twenty years. He can feel an obligation, and when obliged may be entirely confided in. He has spirit, is ready, and will soon if I don’t mistake, be the most popular speaker in the House of Commons.
The office envisaged was another sinecure: of joint vice-treasurer of Ireland. But in September Rigby was much talked of for secretary at war, and ‘the London Evening Post’, wrote Rigby to Bedford, ‘already abuses me as such. I prefer the quiet and the income of what I am to have much before the other.’
I believe I may venture to tell you without much vanity, I might have been secretary at war, but I preferred ease to ambition ... surely to have the principal hand in reducing a large army and attending to their various grievances is a most irksome and unpleasant task.
While Bedford was negotiating the peace treaty in Paris, Rigby served as link between him and the Bute Administration. In the House he closely collaborated with Fox, and defended him, when deserted by many on the Government side, over the committee of accounts and the Newfoundland petition (4 and 23 Mar. 1763). But next, during the negotiations for a new Government on Bute’s retirement (Mar.-Apr. 1763), occurred a sudden break between Fox and his closest associates, Calcraft, Rigby, and Shelburne: they pressed him to relinquish the pay office on receiving his peerage, which he, with equal heat, refused to do. When Fox complained to Rigby of Shelburne, he was treated with studied insult and an anger which suggests a personal interest of Rigby’s in the matter: possibly he already expected to succeed Fox at the pay office. ‘I loved him’, wrote Fox at the time.
If Rigby chiefly, and some others, had pleased, I should have walked down the vale of years more easily; but it is weak in me to think so often as I do of Rigby.
Under the Grenville Administration Rigby was prominent in defending unpopular measures with maximum provocation to opponents (Wilkes and general warrants, the Cider Act, dismissal of officers for votes in Parliament), adding, as pastime of his own, gross abuse of the City of London whenever occasion offered. He kept silent during the Regency crisis and during the division on Morton’s motion to reinstate the Princess Dowager in the Regency bill, 10 May 1765, retired to the Speaker’s chamber ‘and did not vote with the majority, though he had declared nothing should make him vote against the Princess’.
Under the Rockinghams Rigby took a foremost part in opposing the repeal of the Stamp Act; moved for American papers, 18 Dec. 1765; for printing them, 14 Jan. 1766; ‘was rough’ when Dowdeswell moved to rescind the resolution, 17 Jan.; asserting all along the need to enforce Great Britain’s superiority: he ‘set Ireland above the Colonies—yet she subject’, 4 Mar.
Bradshaw wrote to Jenkinson, 9 Sept. 1766:
When the tripartite negotiations broke down at the end of July, and each party was ‘at full liberty to take what part they pleased’, the Bedfords continued to hold a pivotal position: they alone were able to join up with either of the other two parties, or with the Government; and after a good deal of manœuvrinig and some sharp practice on Rigby’s part, a sudden approach by the Bedfords to Grafton on 29 Nov. resulted in their taking office. Rigby was re-appointed joint vice-treasurer of Ireland with a promise of the entire pay office; which was redeemed half a year later. From now till the fall of North, Rigby regularly voted with the Government, present at every division for which the list of Government supporters is extant. Yet he was not quite as frequent a speaker as his attendance and prominence in the House might lead one to expect; and his speeches were usually brief and blunt and took with gusto the unpopular side. On 3 Feb. 1769 he seconded the motion to expel Wilkes; on 17 Mar. moved that his third election was void, and a new writ be issued. With much ingenuity he would defend abuses and ridicule proposals for reform: whether it was a question of continuing the American tax, 8 Nov. 1768, or of the use of troops in riots, 23 Nov. 1768; of punishing a corrupt borough like New Shoreham, February 1771, of disfranchising revenue officers, 12 Feb. 1770, or of Grenville’s bill for securing a fairer trial of election petitions by the House, March 1770; of civil list debts, 2 Mar. 1769, or of pensions and reversionary grants, 5 Apr. 1770.
The Duke of Bedford died on 14 Jan. 1771 (cancelling in his will Rigby’s debt to him of £5,000). Politically the Bedford group now disintegrated, though personal connexions survived; but as there are no papers at Woburn for that period, and Rigby’s own have not been traced, it is difficult to see le dessous des cartes. In October 1773, Horace Walpole, charging the ‘Bedfords’ with intrigues against North, wrote:
Even Rigby, though possessed of the most lucrative post in England, in which he was rapidly raising a fortune, had the vanity of sometimes wishing to be first minister, though, being a very timid politician, however insolent when his circumstances were desperate, he trembled to gaze steadily on the object he coveted.
But Rigby himself repeatedly disclaimed ministerial status or ambitions. On 2 May 1774: ‘When gentlemen had a mind to have a fling at him, they called him a minister; but he never was nor ever should be one.’ And on 28 May 1778: he was ‘totally unacquainted with the real motives’ of the Government’s American policy—‘neither his situation nor habits of life, furnished him with any means of information, but what he heard within those walls’.
He himself urged coercive measures: supported the bill for restraining the trade of Pennsylvania—the Stamp Act was ‘the work of a great minister’, and all the present confusions were due to its repeal; ‘Americans would not fight’, 5 Apr. 1775. ‘America must be conquered, and ... the present rebellion must be crushed’, 27 Oct. Britain should not agree to conditions ‘till the people of America threw down their arms’, 24 Apr. 1776. He gloried in having from the outset supported ‘hostile measures’, 10 may 1776, and having been ‘invariably consistent’ in asserting Britain’s supremacy over all her dominions, 3 Dec. 1777. On 6 Feb. 1778 he defended the employment of Indians in the American war. 26 Nov. 1778: ‘France and America should be considered as one enemy.’
In his view it was not the policy, only its execution that was at fault. When Burgoyne returned on parole after Saratoga, Rigby repeatedly attacked him with the utmost virulence;
Nothing that fell from Mr. Rigby conveyed the most distant idea that he wished administration should be at an end; on the contrary, he lamented the probability that it would be so, and that he himself should be included in the disaster.
And the next day, after a talk with Robinson:
He agreed with me in opinion about Rigby’s disposition that he would go on acting with Lord North for his own interest, though he wished for coalitions that might strengthen our hands.
On 29 Oct. Robinson wrote to Jenkinson:
Rigby really expressed himself pretty anxiously about his ideas of losing his place, and will I think give active and vigorous support, if we can but form a system for carrying on the business of the House of Commons.
Add. 38212, ff. 201-2.
But when pressed by Robinson on 19 Nov. ‘to be explicit as to his support of Government’, Rigby thought that ‘it would not avail’ and ‘we should be left in a minority is some question or another’: he disliked saying so, for clearly ‘he could not with pleasure or satisfaction think of quitting so good a place as he held, and in which he had nothing to do’ [presumably of a political character].
In the session which opened on 25 Nov. 1779 no speech by Rigby is recorded before 29 Feb. 1780; and on 26 Mar. a letter from him to Lady Spencer,
What was to be my motive for such a step? ... I had been in no secrets of Government, in no state of responsibility, literally and bona fide without communication of any sort, almost without acquaintance. Was I called upon by ministers to act any part different from what I had for years supported? Was I personally neglected or slighted? ... To all this I am bound in honest truth to answer in the negative.
To resign, ‘alone, insignificant, and for no end’, would have made him the laughing stock of all parties.
The sessions of parliament opened ... I took no part, unwilling to support and determined, whilst in office, not to oppose. After Christmas Mr. Burke produced his plan of reformation ... I think the adoption of Mr. Burke’s plan to the extent proposed, would be a subversion of this constitution ... without influence and what is called undue influence too, this Government could not subsist.
The pay office and the balances he held (£5–900,000) were no doubt foremost in Rigby’s mind when over economical reform he re-entered the fray. Yet, brazen champion of a system which was rapidly falling into disrepute, he fought the to him odious ideas of reform on the widest front. He ridiculed ‘new converts’ to shorter Parliaments, 8 May 1780; did not believe such was the sense of the people—‘to judge by petitions was a farce’, 7 June 1782; called Pitt’s proposals of parliamentary reform chimerical, 7 May 1782; ‘would sooner see another Member added for Old Sarum ... than ... to the City of London’, 7 May 1783; and ridiculed ‘the idea of any Member being concerned for the character of his constituents’, 20 Nov. 1780.
He opposed attempts to control expenditure of civil list revenue—as much the King’s ‘as any estate enjoyed by any person present’, 8 Mar. 1780; defended sinecures, pensions and jobbery whomsoever they might benefit (6 Mar. and 4 July 1783): grants were as good a title as freehold, and ‘the emoluments of various offices ... the legal rights of the persons in possession’, 7 July 1783;
He voted with North, yet dissociated himself from him. Thus on 8 Mar. 1780 he spoke of North’s predicament: ‘day after day coming down to the House, in majorities which hardly deserved the name; for his own part he never would consent ... to carry on the business of Government, unless he could be sure of a proper and respectable support’. North should ‘speak out, and declare, what he was determined to grant; and what ... to refuse’.
But its justice he had supported throughout, ‘and never gave a single vote which ... in a similar situation, he would not repeat’. If the war was wicked they all shared responsibility for it—vide the Declaratory Act, the Townshend duties; and when the Boston port bill was brought in ‘from which law the present war directly originated, the very gentlemen, who were now most violent in their disapprobation, remained silent and inactive. There was not a division, not a single debate on the subject.’ The American war was just, but it would be madness to persevere in it; it had become impracticable (27 Nov., 14 Dec. 1781, 22 Feb. 1782).
Even before North’s fall, Rigby had come in for severe personal attacks—as one ‘who profited more by the war than any four men in the House’ (William Pitt, 4 Mar.); and who having ‘had the fingering of upwards of £50 million of money ... certainly ought to apply the interest gained ... to the service of the public’ (Fletcher Norton, 8 Mar.).
Rigby turned to his Whig friends: in two letters to Lady Spencer, 21 and 24 June,
he will do everything I can ask, consistent with his present situation. Jack Lee came of his own accord, abusing his colleague the attorney-general sufficiently. But he will be directed by none from the quarter I mention, he takes he clue elsewhere [Shelburne] ...
All I ask is a little time, it is highly improper that large balances should remain for much space of time in the hands of public accountants; but to insist upon our paying interest from the day we quitted office, was never before thought of by anybody.
The outstanding balances made him now court anyone in power. After Rockingham’s death he adhered to Shelburne, and pleaded with North the need of ‘supporting the King’s administration’—‘Rigby is clear and explicit on this’, wrote Robinson to Jenkinson on 17 Sept., ‘and means to support strongly in everything but innovations upon the constitution.’ Meantime Robinson was helping him to arrange with Orde, Shelburne’s secretary to the Treasury, repayment of balances.
Fox and Sheridan have been with me here this evening to consider what is the most proper conduct for me to hold on the attack that Kenyon meditates against me, and we have rather agreed that it will be best, if a fair opportunity should offer, for me to mention to the House the present situation of my balance due to the public. Some discreet management is necessary upon this delicate subject.
—whereupon he was also seeking Lee’s advice.
When on 23 Feb. the attorney-general, Pepper Arden, moved for accounts of Rigby’s balances and pressed for their repayment, Rigby argued that for some time past money could not be got by sale of securities ‘but to the greatest disadvantage’ nor raised ‘without a heavy loss’; but he himself now offered to pay interest on outstanding balances. On this basis an agreement was reached in the summer of 1784.
When on the dismissal of the Coalition a dissolution of Parliament was expected, Rigby found himself ‘adrift for a seat’.
Although listed by parliamentary managers as ‘Opposition’, Rigby does not appear to have been active on their side; only two (non-committal) speeches by him are reported in the new Parliament, 18 Mar., 12 May 1785,
During the next three years Rigby sank into insignificance, and died on 8 Apr. 1788. ‘The recollection of a Rigby’, wrote his friend Henry Dundas in 1789, ‘ ... [is] never out of my mind as a warning to leave the bustle of politics, and the House of Commons, before the vigour of your body and the activity of your mind leave you.’
